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T
he international response to
the severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) outbreak,
from March to July 2003, tested
the assumption that a new and
emerging infection–one that
had not yet demonstrated its full
epidemiologic potential but was
spreading from person to per-
son and continent to conti-
nent–could be prevented from
becoming endemic. Within 4 months after the first global
alert about the new disease, all known chains of transmis-
sion had been interrupted in an outbreak that affected 27
countries on all continents. Most public health experts and
scientists believe that the question of whether SARS has
become endemic, or will re-emerge, can only be answered
after at least 12 months of postoutbreak surveillance. The
SARS experience, however, made one lesson clear early in
its course: inadequate surveillance and response capacity
in a single country can endanger national populations and
the public health security of the entire world. As long as
national capacities are weak, international mechanisms for
outbreak alert and response will be needed as a global safe-
ty net that protects other countries when one nation’s sur-
veillance and response systems fail. 
During the last decade of the 20th century, several out-
breaks, including cholera in Latin America, pneumonic
plague in India, and Ebola hemorrhagic fever in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, caused great interna-
tional concern (1–3). These events demonstrated the con-
sequences that delayed national recognition and response
to outbreaks could have: illness and death of national pop-
ulations including health workers, potential spread to other
countries, and significant disruptions of travel and trade.
These outbreaks also emphasized the need for a global sur-
veillance and response mechanism. The Global Outbreak
Alert and Response Network (GOARN), set up in 1997
and formalized in 2000, was one major response to this
need (World Health Organization [WHO], unpub. data and
4). Though the network, which now has over 120 partners
throughout the world, currently identifies and responds to
more than 50 outbreaks in developing countries each year,
the SARS outbreak was the first time that GOARN identi-
fied and responded to an outbreak that was rapidly spread-
ing internationally. 
One of the partners in GOARN is the WHO Global
Influenza Surveillance Network, which was established in
1947 to guide the annual composition of vaccines and pro-
vide an early alert to variants that might signal the start of
a pandemic of rapidly evolving influenza viruses. This net-
work was placed on alert in late November, when the
Canadian Global Public Health Intelligence Network
(GPHIN), also a partner in GOARN, picked up media
reports of an influenza outbreak in mainland China (5).
Simultaneously, another GOARN partner, the U.S. Global
Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System
(GEIS), became aware of similar reports about a severe
outbreak, with influenza B the suspected cause, in Beijing
and Guangzhou. As GOARN continued to receive reports
about influenza outbreaks in China, WHO requested infor-
mation from Chinese authorities on December 5 and 11.
On December 12, WHO received a detailed report on data
collected at Chinese influenza surveillance sites, indicating
that investigation of 23 influenza virus isolates had con-
firmed type B strains in all but one and that the number of
cases was consistent with the seasonal pattern in previous
years. The information was reassuring and an indication
that the influenza surveillance system was working well.
Although information is incomplete, retrospective case
identification by Chinese and GOARN epidemiologists
since May 2003 suggests that two respiratory disease out-
breaks occurred in Guangdong Province in late November
2002: influenza and what now appears to have been a first
wave of SARS cases—an atypical pneumonia that was
characterized by small, seemingly unrelated clusters of
cases scattered over several municipalities in Guangdong,
with low-level transmission to healthcare workers (6). This
first wave of atypical pneumonia appears to have contin-
ued until a second wave of disease with amplified
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David L. Heymanntransmission to health workers began occurring during the
first 10 days of February (WHO, unpub. data). On
February 10, 2003, the WHO office in Beijing received an
email message describing an infectious  disease in
Guangdong Province said to have caused more than 100
deaths. On February 11, the Guangzhou Bureau of Health
reported to the press more than 100 cases of a respiratory
atypical pneumonia outbreak that had been spreading in
the city for more than 1 month. That same day, the
Chinese Ministry of Health in Beijing officially reported
to WHO 300 cases and 5 deaths in an outbreak of acute
respiratory syndrome, and the next day reported that the
outbreak dated back to November 16, 2002, that influen-
za virus had not yet been isolated, and that the outbreak
was coming under control (7).
When the reports of a severe respiratory disease were
received by WHO on February 11, 2003, a new strain of
influenza virus was the most feared potential cause, and
the WHO Global Influenza Network was again alerted.
Concern grew on February 20, when the network received
reports from Hong Kong authorities confirming the detec-
tion of A(H5N1) avian influenza virus in two persons, and
WHO activated its influenza pandemic preparedness
plans (8).
During that same week, laboratories of the WHO
Global Influenza Surveillance Network began analyzing
specimens from a patient with severe atypical pneumonia
hospitalized in Hanoi after travel to Hong Kong.
Concurrently, GOARN response teams in Vietnam and
Hong Kong began collecting clinical and epidemiologic
information about the patient and a growing number of
others with similar symptoms. As more specimens entered
the network laboratories, influenza viruses were ruled out
as the causative agent. WHO made its first global alert on
March 12, followed by a second, on March 15, when more
than 150 suspected new cases had been reported from sev-
eral geographic areas, including Hong Kong, Singapore,
Vietnam and Canada (9,10). With the second alert, WHO
provided a case definition and name, thus beginning a
coordinated global outbreak response that brought height-
ened vigilance everywhere and intense control efforts.
GOARN linked some of the world’s best laboratory scien-
tists, clinicians, and epidemiologists electronically, in vir-
tual networks that provided rapid knowledge about the
causative agent, mode of transmission, and other epidemi-
ologic features (11). This real-time information made it
possible for WHO to provide specific guidance to health
workers on clinical management and protective measures
to prevent further nosocomial spread. It also made possible
recommendations to international travelers to curtail inter-
national spread. Recommendations were at first nonspecif-
ic, urging international travelers to have a high level of
suspicion if they had traveled to or from areas where the
outbreak was occurring. But as more information became
available, airports were asked to screen passengers for his-
tory of contact with SARS and for persons with current ill-
ness that fit the SARS case definition. Finally, when these
recommendations did not completely stop international
spread, passengers themselves were asked to avoid travel
to areas where contact tracing was unable to link all cases
to known chains of transmission (12). Within 4 months,
transmission of SARS had been interrupted at all sites, and
on July 5, 2003, the SARS outbreak was declared con-
tained (13). 
As many times occurs with emerging and reemerging
infectious diseases, national surveillance mechanisms
failed to identify and respond to the emerging outbreak of
SARS early enough to prevent its toll of sickness, death,
and international spread (14). In May 2003, ministers of
health from the 192 member countries of WHO expressed
their deep concern about the impact of SARS and its impli-
cations for future outbreaks, which were considered
inevitable. In two resolutions, they called for increased
national capacity development for surveillance and
response and endorsed the ways in which GOARN
obtained information about SARS and supported contain-
ment efforts (15,16). The resolutions stressed the need for
countries to give more attention, with WHO support, to the
strengthening of national surveillance and response capac-
ity, and encouraged WHO to continue to strengthen
GOARN, its safety net for global alert and response. As
SARS so amply demonstrated, protection against the threat
of emerging and epidemic-prone diseases requires strong
defense systems at national as well as international levels.
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